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Introduction
This paper provides a historical assessment of the state of defense production m India It also sheds new light 
on the issue of the state monopoly on defense production or to put it more provocatively the production of 
national security m India.1 Examining the nature of the complex relationship between the private sector and 
the state is a core concern for scholars of Indian political economy Smce state autonomy in the defense sector 
is rarely questioned my hypothesis is that situating defense production in the context of the overall political 
economy of state society relations m India provides a neh source of data with which the relative autonomy of 
the Indian state may be better understood The study also argues for a broader definition of the security complex 
than is common along with the ordnance faetones and defense research labs the state owned corporations that 
fall under the Ministry of Defense are also examined Finally this study must be seen m the context of the 
ongoing concern about the changing nature of India s interaction with the international system whether 
charactenzed as an attempt to change its position in the power hierarchy of states or its movement toward a 
more embedded and dependent economic position in the world economic system Examination of a variety of 
economic political technological and military issues m historical perspective helps to situate our understanding 
of the present moment more clearly
Pre Colonial Production of Weapons (— 1757)
It is common to assert that the recorded history of the world is inseparable from the production of lethal 
weapons As the chronicles of its past tell us India is no exception to this trend Weapons described in the 
epics especially those obtained at great personal effort by heroes and villains alike are devastating m destructive 
potential unerring m use and invulnerable to enemy attack In short they sound remarkably like some of the 
more fanciful creations of devoted supporters of the present day Strategic Defence Initiative *
Those weapons aside there is still controversy among historians over the origins of modem weapons 
production in India. The traditional view is based on the absence of the technical knowledge of iron casting 3 
and it implies that modem weaponry like cannon and matchlocks were introduced into India by Europeans m the 
latter half of the 15th century This view is correct insofar that m 1666 the Mughal emperors requested the 
English and the Dutch to recruit five gunfounders and two engineers or pioneers [who were to be] very
expenenced practical men However as Iqndar Alam Khan points out as early as the second quarter of die 
13th century the Mongol armies operating on the northwest frontier of the Delhi Sultanate were already using 
some kind of gunpowder devices ”5 He goes on to show that the use of explosives m siege warfare was not 
uncommon and that while its practice was not fully developed the people of northwest India seemed familiar 
with the devastating nature” of gunpowder based explosives
1 A typical example is the following quotation “In the realm of foreign policy the relative autonomy of the state from domesuc
class dispositions and tensions is in ordinary times seen most clearly While foreign policy does not reduce to defense 
production the implication of autonomy in the sphere o f interAiational security issues is I think clear Vanaik s thought 
provoking work is also one of the few books on the political economy o f Indian development which even considers the external 
sphere seriously and with the complexity it deserves Achín Vanaik The Painful Transition Bourgeois Democracy in India 
(London and New York Verso 1990) p 2
2 In fact it has been semi facetously argued that nuclear weapons were used in the great war that climaxes the epic Mahabharatha
This belief emerges from descriptions o f the effects o f certain divine weapons which killed thousands of soldiers
3 This view is most recently expressed in Geoffrey Parker The Military Revolution Military Innovation and the rise of the West
1500 1800 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1988) p 128 9 ff
4 Irfan Habib “The Technology and Economy of Mughal India Indian Economic and Social History Review 17 1 (Jan Mar 1980)
p 20 Habib is quoting from W Foster ed English Factories in India 1665 67 (Oxford Oxford University Press 1908)
5 Iqtidar Alam Khan Gunpowder Technology in India A D 1250 1500 Indum Historical Review 4 1 (July 1977) p 24
6 Khan “Gunpowder p. 26
2More interestingly there is also evidence from a variety of sources that by the fifteenth century an 
indigenously developed rocket called ban was well known When the British encountered it in the Maratha wars 
they described it as an iron tube of about one foot long and an inch m diameter fixed to a [bamboo] rod of ten 
or twelve feet long The tube being filled with combustible composition is set fire to and being directed by the 
hand flies like an arrow to a distance upwards of 1000 yards ”7 The British must have been quite unpressed as 
rockets copying the principle of ban (the Congreve rocket) were eventually introduced into the British army in 
1806 From the evidence of a Chmese traveller ban was made m Bengal as early as 1406 and was well known 
enough abroad to be exported.8
The inability to cast iron did not mean that there were no locally produced cannon By the end of the 
sixteenth century the Mughal emperor s gunsmiths were casting bronze and made what was probably one of the 
largest cannon in existence at the tune the Malik Maidan This enormous gun was thirteen feet four inches 
long had a muzzle diameter of five feet five inches and threw a ball weighing 550 pounds 9 Contemporary 
observers reported however that the gun was quite useless in battle due to its lack of mobility and large bore 
Greater success was found with muskets and fowlmg pieces though these were probably the less sophisticated 
matchlocks rather than the flintlocks that were certainly m the possession of the Portuguese by this tune
The shipbuilding industry during the seventeenth century seems to have been largely the province of the 
Portuguese While Indian merchant ships were being built they were deigned for use only m the seas 
surrounding them Indian junks had large quantities of sail and shallow drafts and were more suited to carrying 
large amounts of cargo and traversing sandbanks and estuanes British reports from the seventeenth century 
suggest that demand for the older ships had declined but that the local shipbuilders were quick to learn the new 
designs and even improve on them 10
Defence Production in the Colonial Period (1757 1947)
The oldest existing unit of the modem defense complex is the Bombay Naval Shipyard at the Mazagaon Docks 
This shipyard first started repair and building operations in 1735 and is reputed to have built, in 1817 the oldest 
sail driven warship still active today First called H.M S Tnncomalee T S  Foudroyant is now docked at 
Portsmouth England, and used as a training ship of the British Royal Navy 11 According to the Ministry of 
Defence the first ordnance factory was built in 1801 though it is not clear which factory they refer to 12 It 
seems more correct to date the complex from 1818 the year of the founding of the Gun Carnage Factory m 
Fatehpur13 By 1905 there were thirteen faetones and by 1947 sixteen faetones making vanous defense related 
products 14
7 Khan, “Gunpowder ” p 27 For another detailed description of ban see Pankaj Kumar Datta Technological Aspects o f Some
Firearms m Mughal India ” in Amniddha Roy and S K. Bagchi, eds Technology in Ancient and Medieval India (Delhi Sundeep 
Prakashan 1986) p 46
8 Khan "Gunpowder ” pp 25 9
9 Habib T echnology and Economy p 19 Compare this also to the cannon “Mons Meg " which was cast for the Duke of
Burgundy in 1449 “It was three metres long weighed 8 5 tons and hurled a stone shot 500 millimetres in diameter Parker 
Military Revolution p 7
10 The ship builders had grown soe expert and masters o f their art that here are many Indian vessels that in shape exceed those that
come out o f England or Holland quoted m Tapan Raychaudun, "Non agricultural Production m Tapan Raychaudun and Irfan 
Habib eds Cambridge Economic History o f India vol 1 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1982) p 293
11 Satyendra Singh, Under Two Ensigns The Indian Navy 1945 1950 (New Delhi Oxford and IBH Publishing 1986) p 17 He
adds that the initial success o f the yard was established by the first o f a long line o f Parsi master builders Lowjee 
Nusserwanjee Wadia It is not clear whether the Wadias acquired their skills building warships for the famous Maratha admiral 
Kahoji Angre or elsewhere.
12 Department of Defence Production India s  Defence Production Sector A Profile Ministry of Defence Government o f India no
date (1984?) p 2
13 S K. Sen Studies in Economic Policy and Development of India 1848 1926 (Calcutta Progressive Publishers 1966) p 75
Sen s sources are original documents including the official 24 Parganas District Gazeteer Another officially sanctioned work 
A L. Venkatheshwaran s Defence Organization m India (New Delhi Publications Division Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting Government o f India 1967) feels the correct year is 1872 the year that a British built ammunition factory 
c[a]me into operation in us present form (p 291)
14 See the Appendix to this chapter
3Like the development of Indian industry generally modem defense production would never have taken off 
except for the two world wars Till the first war most of the needs of garrisons and cantonments were supplied 
from England and often had to be due to the lack of an adequate industrial base in India. However as 
mentioned above faetones producing guns shells and gun carnages had been set up m West Bengal a region 
relatively more industrialized than the rest of the country In 190S the ordnance faetones employed 12 958 a 
figure that was not to change much till 1914 15 After tins war broke out, the Indian Munitions Board was set 
up (1917) to both expand industrial production and coordinate war related supply operations In Moms s view 
however *few of the wartime manufacturing novelties earned much weight. 16
The Second World War definitely gave a boost to the production of armaments and military matenals 
though the Chatfield Plan had suggested expansion and new investments in the defense production system even 
before the war began During the war the need for an mdependent weapons producing base m India became 
apparent due to greater demand and risk Shipments from England were unreliable and dangerous and Japanese 
victories in South East Asia suggested the likelihood of the Pacific theater becoming the Indian Ocean theater of 
war Under the Rogers Mission in 1940 recommendations were made that led to the creation of eight new 
factories and a number of expansion projects Also overall direction of these faetones was transferred from the 
Royal Ordnance Faetones to the newly created Department of Supply under the Government of India 17
Motivations of Colonial Defense Production
By the late 19th century India had become to use an overused phrase the jewel” of Bntish impenal holdings 
valuable for both the surplus that was extracted from it and for its strategic location vis a vis the rest of the 
Empire As a result Bntish efforts at political hegemony m West and South East Asia could be said to be 
dnven by a dual purpose to protect the approaches to Bntish India and in the process to seek out new regions 
for colonial investment. Certainly the threat perceived by the expansion of Czanst Russia and its much 
ballyhooed search for a warm water” port were directly connected to the fear of eventual loss of power m India.
The secunty of India was ensured via diplomacy m Europe and armed incursions into Afghanistan and Tibet 
to protect the land approaches Equally critical was the Royal Navy which controlled seaward access to the sub 
continent. But over time and especially as the Indian Army grew and began to be used as a proxy arm of 
imperial foreign policy18 it became apparent that the former cumbersome system of military supplies 
especially would have to be changed India itself had to become a source for some of the military material 
needed for these missions
British earnings from India had been used for strategic purposes before The development of the railway 
network to facúltate the movement of troops had been completely paid for by India but its inputs had been 
wholly imported19 Funds for the upkeep of the Indian Army and the costs of various impenal expeditionary 
forces were provided by the colonial government in India. However with this investment in primary industrial 
activities which would support the growth of an indigenous weapons industry the Bntish were creating the 
elements of an industrial pole which would help lead to the diversification of domestic economic activity m the 
next fifty years This strategic need hence was the starting point for the movement from producing relatively 
simple ordnance and ammunition to increased Bntish investment m defense production in India.
The Bntish government did not come to this decision easily It was finally only as a result of the strong 
recommendations of R H Mahon an engineer sent out from England who was actively supported by Major 
General A. Walker then Director General of Ordnance that the decision to develop the production of arms m
15 Sen Studies p 75 using House o f Commons (UK) sources This is confirmed by M om s D M om s “The Growth of Large scale
Industry to 1947 in Dhaima Kumar ed Cambridge Economic History of India voi 2 (Cambridge Cambridge University 
Press 1983) p 599
16 M om s Growth p 600
17 Venkateshwaran Defence Organization p 291 ff
18 Parker Military Revolution p 136
19 See Darnel R. Headnck The Tools of Empire Technology and European Imperialism in the 19th century (Oxford Oxford
University Press 1981) and Tentacles of Power (Oxford Oxford University Press 1988)
4India was taken The first steel bar rolling plant mill was set up in 1896 m the ordnance factory at Cossipore 
Walker felt the Cossipore factory should be self-contained for it was undesirable that India should be 
absolutely dependent on England for the supply of ammunition 20 Steel manufactured in Cossipore went 
largely to other government faetones for example the ordnance factory at Ishapore but the effects of the 
creation of a steel mill influenced the later development of the region by pnvate capital both Indian and Bntish
Apart from the needs of war growing differences in the interests of the Crown represented by the Secretary 
of State for India m London and the Indian government represented by the Viceroy m Delhi had become a 
factor m the relations between metropolis and colony The Viceroyalty had always chafed at the control of their 
activities from London and ever since Curzon s appointment to the Viceregal Palace a degree of independence in 
the behavior of the Indian government has been noted by scholars 21 Protection of industry located m India and 
even state encouragement of these industries to provide a more self reliant economic base was not as 
unthinkable as m the heyday of more typical relations between England and India.
With the advent of the Second World War the security imperative driving defense investment became even 
more pronounced. Eight ordnance faetones were set up m various locations to produce a variety of war goods 
As mentioned earlier the proximity of India to the eastern theater of war made it cntical that these faetones 
provide all or most of the high use defense equipment needed i e rifles shells ammunition mortars clothing 
and food.
The earliest ordnance faetones were centered around Calcutta in the east. In the late 19th century most of 
Bntish agncultural capital was located m the eastern half of the country stretching from the indigo plantations 
of Bihar to the tea gardens of Assam Merchant capital was based in Calcutta which was not only the seat of 
political power but also a pon and the onginal site of Bnush dominance since 17S7 Taking these 
considerations into account and bearing in mind the relatively well developed infrastructure of the region once 
the decision to mvest was made locating the early defense faetones here was obvious This area then developed 
into the first pole of defense and later civilian industrial activity
From 1939 with the rapid expansion of existing faetones and the creation of new ones a new region 
emerged as the prime beneficiary of state investment Rather than worry about the benefits of economic 
linkages and the costs of haphazard industrial investment, all new faetones were simply located in the heartland 
of the country as far away from the theater of war as possible 22 In spite of its relatively underdeveloped 
industrial base most of the new and translocated units were placed in the area around Kanpur m the heart of the 
Gangetic plain 23
It should be noted however that Kanpur did have some advantages It was close to the new colonial 
capital Delhi but not too close there was surplus labor that could be employed it was well connected by rail 
to the capital and to the eastern regions of the country where in the case of attack its munitions and material 
would be sent24 Given the new strategic environment Kanpur was well placed which must have ovendden the 
high economic costs after all keepmg costs to a minimum was the factor that drove locational considerations 
m the pre First World War era.
It should be added that in a few cases the choice of location was probably determined by physical factors 
For example the ordnance faetones set up in Aruvankadu and Dehra Dun appear to owe their location to firstly
20 Sen Studies p 76
21 See for example, The India Office
22 This lack of concern with macro-economic considerations was possible because the government was after all a colonial sute 
The imperative for the Bnush was the safety and secunty of the colonial possession not regional development though that 
may have been an unexpected outcome
23 See map m M om s Growth p 601 on regional patterns o f industnalizauon in 1931
24 From this early beginning Kanpur has developed into a huge industrial region sull including a large defense nucleus It is not 
clear whether the development potential o f sute spending sank into the minds o f planners at that time after all
Keynesianism (counter-cyclical su te spending) as a set o f policy guidelines was only just becoming accepted as the new  
orthodoxy
the climatic conditions and secondly the existence of large military installations nearby 25 Both these sites 
the foimer in the deep south and the latter northeast of Delhi are about 5000 feet above sea level and have 
temperate climates The environment is dust free and the milder temperatures inhibit the explosive potential of 
the raw matenals The climate is probably similar to the area around the Bntish faetones that served as models 
for the Indian plants
Two conclusions may be drawn First, the need to create new sites of defense production led to the 
dispersion of state sponsored industrial nodes away from a single locus By 1947 Pune and Kanpur as well as 
existing (West) Bengal sites had developed into larger defense sectors that later specialized m certain production 
activities Linkages with nearby industry the employment created and the infrastructural capital invested made 
these regions physically more developed than neighboring areas and lowered the cost of investment for later 
civilian industry
Second this investment was an unusual step The use of state funds to create industry where there was 
none before is inherently a developmental policy typical of an independent state seeking to widen its economic 
base It is clear that the industrial development of India would reduce Bntish exports of manufactured goods m 
the long run and provide a precedent that could be used by colonies like Australia to demand their own 
industnes It should also be remembered that industrial development m India was being encouraged at a time 
when the virtues of free trade and free markets were tenets of Bntish foreign economic policy not only m areas 
of its own hegemony but m South Amenca as well This policy could only have come about if the longer term 
secunty reasons for it were very strong confirming agam how closely Bntish impenal interests were tied to the 
continued possession of India and its littoral
Defence Production m Independent India, 1947 1964 Phase I
Immediately after mdependence m 1947 within then limited capacities the faetones produced goods for the 
Army that had formerly been unported from Bntain This was a difficult penod for them technologically since 
production m the ordnance faetones had been completely dependent on the supply of designs expertise and some 
matenals from abroad Hence replacement of foreign goods implied as well a replacement of cntical missing 
components especially manpower After 1947 there were only 26 Indians of gazetted rank m the ordnance 
services compared to 79 Europeans In response between 1948-49 and 1953 54 75 Indians were sent to vanous 
locations m Europe and the US for training 26 After a short penod when the ordnance faetones had substituted 
all the defense goods they were capable of they turned to the civilian market to commue import substitution
Attempts were made to streamline the ordnance factory system most notably the Committee under Defence 
Minister Baldev Singh m January 1954 which led to the formation of the Defence Production Board and three 
supporting committees in November 1955 The function of the committee was to report on the working of the 
Ordnance Faetones and in particular the possibility of utilizing the idle capacity of the factory fo r producing 
items o f civilian consumption ”27
It should be noted that during this penod of institutional decime of domestic weapons production the armed 
services were not suffenng for lack of equipment In the 1950s the amount of weapons imported especially by 
the Air Force and Navy increased tremendously 28 These weapons purchases were not a response to new threats 
to national secunty By and large they replaced worn out and obsolescent equipment dating from the war and 
filled the gaps m the arsenals of the services Smce during the world war Indian armed forces had been 
subordinate to the overall strategic plans of the Allied powers this had led to a force profile that was only 
complete within the larger structure Hence some of the arms purchases of this penod were simply to replace
25 Aiuvankadu is a few miles from the regimental headquarters of the Madras Regiment (Wellington) while Dehra Dun is the site of
most notably the (then Royal) Indian Military Academy
26 Venkateshwaran Defence Organization p 294
27 Venkateshwaran Defence Organization p 297 emphasis added
28 For a list o f the imported systems see Andy Lee Ross Secunty and Self Reliance Military Dependence and Conventional Arms
Production in the Developing World (Ph D diss Cornell Umversity 1984) and Raju G C Thomas The Defence of India A 
Budgetary Analysis (Columbia MI South Asia Books 1979)
6missing systems that had formerly been maintained by the British and the US Not surprisingly these missing 
systems were mostly technologically sophisticated weapons that could not be manufactured in India at this urne 
íe  aeroplanes tanks and naval surface ships
Through the 1950 s for those within the defense sector the problem was perceived as follows While a 
number of production units for the production of lethal equipment did exist under the aegis of the state they 
were inadequate and functionally fragmented As an early Defence Secretary put it, these faetones had been set 
up to meet ad hoc requirements” and largely to serve only the needs of the Army 29 Inthispenod however 
defense production policy was centered around organizational change with the idea of making the system more 
efficient rath» than increasing its size As mentioned above governmental concern with the ordnance faetones 
led to the reorganization of management and control via the formation of the Defence Production Board and its 
three supporting committees While there were steps taken to increase the complexity of the output of the 
defense production sector these steps hardly suggest a concerted and coherent state policy as was desired by some 
defense bureaucrats
On the one hand recognition of the need to construct units producing vital inputs for a defense production 
sector led to the formation of Bharat Electronics Limited (1954) a public sector corporation under the Ministry 
of Defence which was to design develop and progressively manufacture elec trame equipment such as 
transmitters transreceivers and to undertake the manufacture of specialized and electronic components 30 
Another important new facility was the Machine Tools Prototype factory at Ambemath Finally a decision was 
made m 1959 to ignore private sect»  capabilities m automobile production and to begin the licensed production 
of trucks jeeps and earth moving equipment within the defense sector
On the other hand, an existing state owned corporation Praga Tools Limited, was also mcluded under the 
Ministry of Defence The reason was literally because someone thought it might make certain parts for 
carbines used by our defense forces ” This company had first been run by the state government of Andhra 
Pradesh then taken over as a sick” unit by the Union Ministry of Industries Perhaps not surprisingly the 
attempt at reviving an industrial unit under the protected conditions of the Ministry of Defence was so successful 
that m fact it was able to declare a dividend for the first time in its history ”31 The success of the presumed 
overarching goal of efficient and modem defense production however goes unrecorded
Also suggesting the haphazard state of defense production policy during this period (1956) was the attempt 
to build an indigenous supersonic aircraft at the state aircraft manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Limited 
(HAL) While utilizing foreign design expertise the scale and scope of this project was far beyond indigenous 
capabilities at this time and suffered as well the basic problem of the lack of a suitable power plant At this 
time quite independently of its aircraft business HAL was also making rail coaches for the civil sector
Factors Impinging on Defense Production m this Period
In the early post independence period the production of arms declined in importance as a priority of state 
activity Various commissions were set up to examine defense science (the Blackett Report) streamline the 
industry (Baldev Singh Committee) and develop atomic energy (1948) but on the whole state investment in 
domestic production of defense equipment was low
The prevailing view was that while having an indigenous defense industry was important for an independent 
state in India its social cost was not justified There were more important development issues at stake that, in 
turn meant strictly economic development This was the time of debates about the respective virtues of 
balanced and unbalanced growth planned versus unplanned economies mixed versus free market systems and
29 Venkateshwaran Defence Organization p 297
30 Third Report Committee on Public Undertakings Fifth Lok Sabha (1971 72) Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi p 2 A 
number of collaboration agreements with foreign firms were signed most importantly with CSF (now CSF Thomson) o f France
31 H C Sann in Press Insutute of India ed Defence of india (New Delhi Vikas Publications 1967) p 52
other variations in economic strategy but in any case the lack of modem industrial capital was perceived to be 
the central issue of underdevelopment.32
While hoping security concerns could be kept at bay by a combination of diplomacy and weapons imports 
although the need for defense was clear scarce domestic capital would be used for economic development With 
regard to the latter Indian policy makers became aware that it was always easier to get credit for weapons 
purchases even when loans for civilian development were not always available In their minds arms were still 
an instrument of security* this external dependence was abhorrent but less important because of the privileging 
of other means í e  diplomatic instruments over conventional military security measures 33 The centrality of 
this tradeoff in state security policy cannot be separated from the views of the first Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru.
This is not the place to go into Nehru s formative influences many biographies and critical works do this 
in great depth controversy and clanty 34 Whatever these influences were Nehru s beliefs in the 1950s seem 
quite clear m one respect There was an absolute opposition between purely defense related issues and civilian 
development but not between overall naUonal security and development This ideology of national security 
which may be now coming back into vogue 35 sees the security of the state as ultimately dependent on the 
industrial capabilities or strength of the economy the crucial variable hence is economic development rather 
than the amount of weapons or arms possessed by the armed forces since these can always be produced by an 
industrially diversified and developed state However in the short run while the vital industrial base of the 
country was being strengthened, diplomacy was critical m keeping the country secure These views are so fully 
expressed m a speech during the presentation of the defense budget to the Lok Sabha m 1956 that I present a 
rather lengthy excerpt
The hon Member who spoke just before me asked us to give (the armed forces) the latest equipment 
best training and all that What exactly does that mean1? In nothing I think has there been such a 
rapid such a great improvement m technology as in defense or in war technology Of course the 
latest example of that—the final example—is nuclear weapons atomic bomb or hydrogen bomb That 
is the final culmination of this process up till now If you judge from that it simply means this that 
no country in the world practically speaking excepting the two great powers [are] adequately defended, 
because only they have enough of these nuclear weapons How then does one judge this adequacy 
of defense of a country9
What is the equation of defense9 In what lies the strength of a people for defense9 Well one thinks 
immediately about defense forces army navy airforce Perfectly right. They are the spear points of 
defense How do they exist9 What are they based on9 The more technical you get, as armies and 
navies and air forces are getting the base is the industrial and technological development o f the country 
Therefore apart from the [armed forces] you want an industrial and technological background m 
the country Because i f  the country s economy is not sound the country in fact is not a relatively 
prosperous country [—] so fa r as its economy and people are concerned it is a weak country
I have often said that the real answer to the atomic bomb lies m other spheres I mention this because 
m the final analysis what counts is not your soldier or your military weapon but the spint of unity of 
the people the will of the people to survive in spite of every difficulty and every menace So the
32 The opposing sides in the underdevelopment debate in the 1950s received their most extreme statements from Albert 
Hirschman and Rodenstein Rodan on the unbalanced hand and Ragnar Nurske on the side o f balanced growth Both parties 
however took as central to the problem the conclusions of the Hanod Domar model o f macroeconomic growth— more capital 
created more development Ragnar Nurkse Problems o f Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (New York Oxford 
University Press 1953) Albert Hirschman The Strategy o f Economic Development (New Haven Yale University Press 1958)
33 It is interesting to note that in these earlier simpler times the separation of the instrumental and final value of weapons was 
very dear It is only with the internalization of the principle o f deterrence that this distincuon becomes blurred and the 
possession o f (nuclear) weapons itself is an end For example the classic Gausewitzian dictum defining war only m the context 
o f overall foreign policy presupposes purely conventional weapons
34 S Gopal, Michael Brecher Nehru A Political Biography (London 1959) R K Karanjia The Mind of Mr Nehru An Interview
(London 1960)
35 For a recent exposition see the papers presented at Development Dynamics Security and Political Considerations an 
international conference held at the Bangladesh International Institute for Strategic Studies Dhaka Dec 12 14 1989
8equation of defense is your defense forces plus your industrial and technological background thirdly
the economy of the country and fourthly the spuit of the people
An hon Member I am told said here What is the good of your Five Year Plans9 You must 
concentrate on defense That is a grave statement to make But the Five Year Plans [are] the defense 
plan of the country What else is it9 because defense does not consist of people going about marching 
up and down the road with guns and other weapons [Security exists] today m a country which is 
industrially prepared fo r defense which can produce the goods the equipment Therefore the right 
approach to defense is—well one obvious approach of course is friendly relations with other 
countries to avoid having unfriendly relations which might lead to conflict But any kind of 
blustering attitude [in foreign affairs] is neither becoming to a dignified nauon nor is it safe not is it 
appreciated by anyone m the world It is a sign of weakness not strength Therefore we must cultivate 
friendly relations and we must cultivate and spread the feeling that no subject, no quarrel is big enough 
for war to be required to settle it or to put it differently that war today is and ought to be out of the 
question 36
In practice the interpretation of these views led to the development of a stark dichotomy between civilian 
and defense production In the perception of state managers and political elites the ordnance faetones 
especially were seen as a net dram on the economy Appearing overstaffed and underproductive they take funds 
away from directly productive development activity Hence with little else to justify their existence the 
obvious decision was to turn ordnance factory output towards the civilian market to keep the faetones active and 
labor employed The motivation unlike most investment in the non defense public sector which was for 
infrastructure development, was ultimately to ensure their own survival Positive balance sheets and visible 
products helped reduce the overall cnucism as well as appeared to further the industrial policy of import 
substituting industrialization (ISI)
From the late 1950s a new vitalism emerged in the Defence Ministry due to the newly appointed Minister 
of Defence V K. Knshna Menon 37 Knshna Menon s contnbution to the formation of the security complex 
was the first well formulated and committed operationalization of the rhetorical goal of self sufficiency m 
defense production His gamble was to try and achieve increased indigenous defense production and affirm the 
social value of added spending on the armed forces visibly and with full responsibility for failure The 
following comments by a high ranking and retired bureaucrat and air force chief respectively are typical of 
Menon s impact ‘With the arrival of Mr Knshna Menon m the scene there was an immediate change [m the 
way the Ministry was run]”38 and but for Knshna Menon I doubt whether anything would have been done to 
increase the supply of Indian made arms and equipment to our services ”39 But the gamble did not quite pay off 
As one observer put i t
There can be no doubt about it, that for the first time since Independence the defense apparatus of the 
nation was receiving the attention and direction it needed, from the new Minister of Defence the fatal
36 Jawahaiial Nehru excerpted from Lok Sabha Debates Pan 2 12th Session volume 2 5 23 March (1956) pp 3270 3274 
Emphases added
37 Knshna Menon was an unusual figure in the world of Indian politics He had lived in England for over twenty years during the
colonial penod and was deeply involved in a number of activiues including giving nationalist Indian views a voice in England 
in local community politics and publishing He even served as a councilman for a number of years He then served as India s 
first High Commissioner to England after 1947 at the time the most importimi diplomatic post for the country After returning 
to Lidia m the mid 50s and already in the public eye due to the so-called jeep scandal the protection that he received from 
Nehru could have had a part in developing the intense hatred he aroused m many others At a time when the sycophancy around 
political leaders was already beginning to be institutionalized Menon s distinct and stndent voice could always be heard 
saying exactly what he felt and why He was seen as so close to Nehru that criticism of him could be construed as criticism of 
Nehru which made him a dangerous person to cross A detailed analysis o f his beliefs may be found m Michael Brecher s 
discussions with him Knshna Menon There is a sympathetic biography by T J George Krishna Menon The jeep scandal is 
fully covered in Surendranath Dwivedy and G S Bhargava Political Corruption in India (Delhi Popular Book Services 1967) 
pp 43 62
38 P V R Rao India s Defence Policy and Organization since Independence USI National Security Lectures United Service
Institution of India.
39 P C Lai My Years with the IAF (Delhi Lancen Publishen 1986) p 25
9weakness m the situation lay in the fact that there was simply not enough poliucal support and 
backing behind the Defence Minister 40
This lack of broad based support for Menon s policies seemed to be motivated, above all by a dislike of the 
person and his style so much so that his closeness to Nehru could not save him After the fateful war with 
China m 1962 the responsibility for the failure of the Army fell on his shoulders and he was forced to resign
Krishna Menon s reforms were aimed at centralizing and rationalizing decisionmaking about defense 
production At the organizational level the Defence Production Board was revamped and renamed The new 
Defence Minister s Production Committee expanded its membership and functions and concentrated 
administrative power m one body directly under full ministerial control41 A number of existing committees 
and panels were dissolved or reconstituted making this Board the primary administrative organ for overseeing the 
entire defense complex
The associated committees had clearly defined and separate functions The Defence Production Advisory 
Committee was to interact with the private sector to examine possibilities of cooperation and to ensure non 
duplication of productive capacity The Defence Production and Supply Committee was committed to 
indigenization of imported stores (import substitution) and to making the stores allocation and distribution 
process more efficient The Defence Research and Development Committee was to advance and coordinate 
defense-related research underway m the armed forces and scientific establishments
More than material achievements during his tenure and apart from his organizational changes what was 
given form and would sharply modify the beliefs of the civilian defense bureaucracy from this point onward was 
the imperative of self reliance What this translated to in practice was not always clear m the 1950s self 
reliance was taken solely to mean import substitution This policy was not helped by an uneasy cohabitauon 
with a private sector that wanted to ensure the state did not compete with the civilian economy and the armed 
forces that wanted the latest equipment from abroad, preferably from the United States or Britain Finally 
Defence Ministry units still had to appear efficient and in the larger public interest Krishna Menon s defense of 
his budget m the Lok Sabha (1961) suggests all these factors
Thanks to the decision by the government to go more and more mto indigenous production whereby it 
is possible for us to improve on what other people have made and what is more to be able to make 
things for ourselves When I come to the figures of foreign exchange [savings] in 1957 58 
stores from abroad were Rs 93 57 crores but m 1961 62 it came down to Rs 44 84 crores Bharat 
Electronics came in quite rightly for a considerable amount of criticism Two aspects of this question 
have been raised One is why should this be a defense factory7 Well it was started seven years ago as 
a defense factory because the defense people were expected to be the largest users of electronic 
instruments and what is more there are certain products under secret list with the Defence Ministry 
which have to be manufactured there But Bharat Electronics works also for the Railway Ministry the 
Home Ministry the Transport Ministry and everybody else 42
It turned out what was needed for a concerted effort m self reliance first to begin and second to expand m 
definition was military disaster Real” domestic weapons production was set into motion only after the 1962 
war with China and even more so after the 1965 war with Pakistan when the United Kingdom and the United 
States placed an embargo on defense equipment to the sub comment
To quickly summarize m the immediate post independence penod a limited amount of defense production 
in India was earned out m the ordnance faetones inherited from colonial rule Efforts at indigenization took the 
form of upgrading machinery and equipment to provide domestic substitutes for imports and to expand the 
production of low value items like small arms ammunition clothing and so on Import substitution took the 
form of replacing some forms of external dependence especially with regard to personnel By the end of the 
decade the ordnance faetones were also producing on license wheeled vehicles like trucks and earth movers
40 S S Khera India s Defence Problem (New Delhi Orient Longman s 1968) p 219
41 It had formerly been chaired by the Munster of Defence Organization a junior Cabinet position
42 Krishna Menon excerpted from Lok Sabha Debates 13th Session 2nd senes voi 54 Apnl 11 21 (1961)
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Defence Production as Core State Activity 1964 1989 Phase II
The Ministry of Defence Annual Report of 1964 65 heralded the changes that were put into practice that year as 
a result of the China war For the first time there was to be a defense plan to be implemented over a period of 
five years The plan mcluded strengthening the defense production base to eventually meet the requirements of 
arms and ammunition and improving the fields of procurement storage training etc ’43
Many changes were made in the penod immediately following this policy shift New defense public sector 
corporations were set up and old ones expanded HAL s railway coach fabrication division was separated from 
the aircraft manufacturing unit and combined with an earth moving division to form Bharat Earth Movers 
Limited (BEML) BEML made its first sales m 1964-65 The government entered into a production agreement 
with the USSR to make Mig 21s m India HAL was given the overall responsibility for production and new 
plants were set up in Koraput and Nasik An existing facility in Hyderabad was modified as well to produce 
aviation electronics
The Electronic Committee or Bhabha Committee issued its report in 1966 which outlined the steps needed 
to create a self-contained electronics industry in India This led to the formation of the Electronics Corporation 
of India Limited (ECIL) which came into production a year later The Vijayanta tank project, the manufacture 
on license of a modified British Vickers tank was set up m Avadi near Madras at the Heavy Vehicles Factory 
With the addition of a dedicated R&D unit, the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment 
(CVRDE) this facility has smce become the core of the Mam Battle Tank (MBT) development project of the 
late 1980s and 1990s
The late 1960s saw the incorporation of the Goa Shipyards Limited (GSL) as a Defense Production State 
Undertaking (DPSU) This existing unit was taken over by the government in 1963 and initially managed by 
Mazagaon Docks but has since acquired more autonomy Projects to manufacture machine tools and 
engineering goods were taken up by the Garden Reach Shipyards and Engineers (GRSE) in Ranchi and Calcutta. 
Bharat Dynamics went on stream m 1971 72 This unit is the dedicated producer of guided missiles Its first 
project was an agreement with Aerospatiale of France to manufacture first generation guided anti tank missiles 
The next agreement was signed with M/s Euromissile for the production of second generation missiles The 
most recently created unit is Mishra Dhatu Nigam (Midham) which began production of specialized metals and 
alloys in 1981 82 These non ferrous alloys are used in the manufacture of aircraft especially Soviet aircraft 
and by the Department of Space Midham s other clients include the defense research establishment and the 
nuclear power stations
Fiscal Dimensions of State Action
The objectives of examining this data are to get an idea of the size of the complex and to study the rates of 
growth periods of investment and changes over time in the defense sub complex m the last forty years 44
43 Annual Report 1964-65 Ministry of Defence G ovt o f India p 2.
44 The data provided here are all from official sources This has its own problems as the Indian state has always been particularly
reticent about releasing detailed figures about the armed forces and defense sector The democratic process however requires the 
defense budget to be presented annually in Parliament where it should be discussed and approved
The Defence Service Estimates as the defense budget figures are called, are the most commonly used empirical data 
source by security analysts They are divided into the amounts requested for capital investment and for revenue 
expenditure The latter amount, revenue expenditure are divided by service and include figures on salaries pensions 
works and maintenence and military farms and other ongoing costs but also on the DRDO and ordnance faetones The 
last two items have been extracted from the revenue expenditure data for this analysis The capital expenditure figures 
which really determine the scale o f the revenue figures are of more interest to us here and are being presented under the 
heads of the three services
For the state owned corporations whether formally under the Defence Ministry or other state organs fairly detailed 
financial information can be culled from the annual reports o f the Bureau of Public Enterprises (Annual Report on the 
Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the Central Government) This Bureau which is charged with 
overseeing the operations o f state corporations and reporting the results to Parliament is now under the aegis o f the 
Ministry o f Industry having been transferred from the Ministry o f Finance The advantage of using this source as
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Examining the macroeconomic data on state expenditures and defense output affirms the validity of the penod 
1962 to 1966 as the take off point” for the Indian defense production sector This data also suggests two 
phases of a concerted state policy of weapons production and related scientific industrial activity 1962 80 marks 
the first penod of secular increases m spending and resources devoted to this sector and 1980 to the present, the 
next45
Expenditures on ordnance faetones went up threefold (adjusted for inflation) m the penod between the early 
1960s and the present Considering the entire security complex the increase in capital employed is quite 
remarkable
Table 1 Capital Employed m State Owned Defense Corporations (Rs Lakhs* m 1960 prices Selected Years)
Year Capital Average
1962 3 3 755 21 751 04
1963 4 4 566 97 913 39
1964 5 5 843 36 973 89
1965 6 7 481 45 1 246 91
1966 7 10 122 07 1 687 01
1980 1 287 357 47 31 928 61
1981 2 429 369 31 42 936 93
1982 3 561 945 24 56 194 52
1983 4 739 716 05 73 971 61
1984 5 890 849 05 89 084 91
*Rs 1 Lakh is Rs 100 000
Source Annual Report on the Working o f Industrial and Commercial Undertakings o f the Central Government 
Bureau of Public Enterpnses Ministry of Finance Government of India, vanous issues
The following features of the tables presented here should be noted First capital employed in the so called 
production units (the state owned enterpnses) have gone from Rs 375 5 million in 1962 63 to Rs 89 085 
billion ($7.2 billion) m 1984 85 adjusted for inflation This statistic excludes the capital investment m the 
military itself and the ordnance faetones If we include these figures as well total state investment m 1984 85 
was Rs 197 4 billion ($15 9 billion) at 1960 pnces In the same penod sales of these public sector firms 
have gone from Rs 211 6 million to Rs 89 067 billion ($7 2 billion) and profits have gone from Rs 16 38 
million to Rs 3 7 billion ($300 million)
opposed to corporate annual reports is firsUy the ease o f collection of the data and secondly the comparability o f the 
data collected For more detailed case studies however there would be no substitute for using the actual balance sheets 
of the relevant state corporations Also o f use for more detailed studies are the Reports o f the Parliament s Committee 
<m Public Undertakings which while it provides little financial data every few years examines in some detail the 
working of these firms and gets the responses of management to their questions and comments 
45 In attempting to regress the data on state expenditure against time exponential functions were found to fit better from 1962
1987 and linear functions for data from 1962 to 1979 80 These results are not conclusive statistically because of the paucity of 
data points
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Table 2 Capital Outlay Ordnance Faetones and Total Armed Services (Rs Lakhs in 1960 pnces Selected Years)
Year Ordnance Factories Total
1962 63 6 736 8 12 578 95
1963 64 12 551 81 24 630 11
1964 65 11 564 58 27 169 30
1965 66 12 657 52 32 387 88
1966 67 14 869 99 34 561 47
1967 68 20 756 18 41 403 63
1968 69 21 618 03 43 128 90
1969 70 20 543 10 46 880 49
1980 81 273 769 04 451 764 31
1981 82 355 258 75 638 049 34
1982 83 393 674 87 729 410 49
1983 84 454 176 83 898 570 09
1984 85 520 753 54 1 083 304 82
1985 86 660 788 42 1 462 769 12
1986 87 881 502 63 3 317 652 61
Source Defence Service Estimates various issues
These figures however are misleading m some ways Three firms Hindustan Aeronautics Bharat 
Electronics and Bharat Earth Movers Limited account for most of the sales and profits of this sector Of these 
three only Hindustan Aeronautics is a truly dedicated supplier to the defense sector with 90% of BEML s sales 
and one third of BEL s sales gomg to the pnvate or non-defense sectors The proportion of BEML s sales to the 
defense sector may be expected to increase however as it may become one of the production sites of the new 
Mam Battle Tank project and supply the launch platform for surface to surface missiles 46 Of the other firms 
Praga Tools also a large supplier to the civilian market has recently (1986) been transferred to the Ministry of 
Industry due to its concentration m this area The earnings of the three shipyards fluctuate due to inconsistencies 
m naval procurement policies and the large size of single orders They have attempted of late to diversify and 
expand their civilian functions m order to remam financially viable as they wait for state orders The Electronics 
Corporation of India is also a substantial supplier to the civilian market especially m consumer electronics Of 
the remaining firms due to the nature of their products most of the output of Bharat Dynamics (guided 
missiles) and Midham (special alloys) goes directly to the military or to the space sector
In summary in the traditional defense production sector there are firms that are solely dedicated to the armed 
forces and defense sector and denve their sole raison d’etre from them These include HAL BDL and Midham 
Then there are firms like BEL and BEML that have specialized qualities that are useful for military purposes but 
interact far more frequently and perhaps intensely with the civilian market They represent as well the cream of 
the state sector in the Indian economy m terms of their earnings and financial stability due to their specialized 
technologies access to state subsidies as a result of their defense sector association and aggressive marketing and 
managerial policies
The three shipyards are somewhere m between On the one hand they are holders of specialized technologies 
for defense purposes but are stymied by the infrequency and irregularity of orders from the Navy On the other 
hand, they can equally provide these services to the civilian economy but are restricted from doing so because of 
the nature of their operations There is a technological constraint m that there is very hule flexibility in the 
functions of shipyards once a commitment to a certain project has been given and a marketing constraint m that 
they tend to be passive sellers of services rather than active In other words they are m the position of not 
being able to affect the market for their product relative to the market demand
46 Interview with retired BEML manager Bangalore October 27 1989
Table 3 Actual Expenditure on Ordnance Faetones Selected Years (Figures in millions of 1985 Rupees)
Year Outlays
1962 63 3 620 284
1967 68 4 739 355
1971 72 6 031 876
1975 76 7 853 412
1980 81 8 225 594
1986 87 11 381 277
Source Defence Service Estimates Ministry of Defence Government of India, various issues
The ordnance faetones may be thought of in the following ways They perform the majonty of the impon 
substituting functions that the defense industry was mandated to do m post independence India, especially for the 
Army They produce the uniforms boots tents field kitchens camouflage nets and other basic equipment for 
the soldier m the field They also produce the carbines explosives field artillery shells and other ammunition 
for the larger guns They manufacture transpon vehicles and jeeps armored personnel earners armored cars and 
tanks Most of the capital equipment and machinery that is used to produce this equipment was imponed or 
adapted from existing vintage machinery They are also the production units for the defense research sector when 
defense R&D comes up with products that have been accepted by the armed services that are often modifications 
or improvements of existing systems For this they have often created an entire new production line with its 
attendant capital costs Hence we see a growth trend m ordnance factory capital expenditures that mareases 
steadily over time especially m the last fifteen years This should be interpreted as capital investment due to 
the exhaustion of the first stage of import substitution (of smaller items and high use products) and investment 
due to the growing importance of Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the greater 
importance of indigenous technologies in domestic defense producuon
We get a further insight mto the insignificance of this expenditure by examining total government figures 
on investment and consumption in the economy While between 1962 63 and 1968 69 state capital formation 
m the economy declined in real terms (1985 pnces) investment in the DPSUs and armed forces either increased 
or stayed constant The same phenomenon occurs between 1979 80 and 1983 84 Overall government 
investment dropped and yet every indicator of investment m the defense sector showed a remarkable nse Key 
moments of transition in the secunty complex occurred in spite of declining state activity elsewhere The 
importance given to this sector cannot be better demonstrated than by this statistic showing a lack of relation to 
the net availability of resources generally 47
Table 4 Defence Production Unit Sales and Central Loans (Rs Lakhs in 1960 prices Selected Years) 
Year Sales__________________________ Loans
1962 3 2 116 19 526 01
1963 4 2 870 49 916 91
1964 5 3 751 24 680 29
1965 6 5 375 78 1 047 84
1966 7 9 169 69 3 748 59
1967 8 14 872 87 8 206 43
1968 9 19 353 99 10 654 98
1980 1 232 296 40 114 836 06
1981 2 403 164 83 156 344 62
1982 3 527 381 78 189 279 07
1983 4 724 765 10 220 8 86 76
1984 5 890 672 08 211 183 12
Source Annual Report on the Working o f Industrial and Commercial Undertakings o f the Central Government Bureau 
of Public Enterprises various issues
Resources for investment in the defense complex are derived from internal capital formation and also via 
access to state financial agencies The pattern appears to be that the largest quotient of state loans are given m
47 The opportunity cost o f defense investment could also be expressed in terms of the foreign exchange component being utilized 
and its effect on the domestic cost o f capital. This expands the fiscal deficit and has inflationary implications all these costs 
are ultimately borne (though differently) by different sectors of civil society
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the most uncertain period for any new firm namely the start up phase and from that point on the ratio of 
capital employed to government loans steadily increases Loans are given at below market rates as is standard 
practice for the long term development financial agencies like the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) 
or Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI)
After examining Table 4 above and data from individual firms the pattern of funding suggests state funds 
appear to be critical at the point of inception of the firm but the relative amounts of state loans declines with 
respect to the total capital employed over time Sales from the defense public sector units increased slowly m 
the 1960s and then increased rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s One of the reasons for the remarkable rise in the 
value of sales seen after 1973 is the higher cost of imported components due to the oil crises Since most of 
these firms are near monopolists and operate on a cost plus basis it was possible to pass on most of the 
increased costs to the final consumer whether state or private sector
As m the British penod we get some confirmation of the concerted nature of state behavior by observing 
the regional effects of expenditure on the security complex By the beginning of the 1990s a number of 
specialized poles of military industrial activity can be easily observed 48 Bangalore (Karnataka) Hyderabad 
(Andhra Pradesh) Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh) and Pune (Maharashtra) are the locations most easily defined
Located in the south Bangalore is the core of the aircraft and electronics sectors of the complex While it 
has always had a sizable military establishment, the city has expanded enormously since 1947 and is now the 
home of three defense public sector corporations HAL BEL BEML and many R&D labs Also giant public 
sector corporations like BHEL ITI and HMT have their headquarters here The private sector too has expanded 
into Bangalore often moving from traditional locations like West Bengal One of India s premier research 
institutions the Indian Institute of Science is located here as is one of the Indian Institutes of Management
Hyderabad too has a number of DRDO labs and other units specializing m electronics but is better 
characterized as the space complex along with its supporting ancillary units like special alloys and the nuclear 
fuel complex It is the home of the Electronics Corporation of India (ECIL) Midhani Praga Tools and Bharat 
Dynamics Most of the space research and fabrication is located m the ISRO complex There are defense labs 
like the Defence Electronics Research Lab (DLRL) two large universities in the city and a prestigious regional 
engineering college at nearby Warangal
Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh in the heart of the country is the location for the vehicle and automotive 
sector There is a gun carnage factory here where combat vehicles are made a vehicle factory which produces 
trucks and jeeps and an iron foundry to provide industrial inputs Compared to Bangalore and Hyderabad it 
represents the lower end of the technological range as it specializes m traditional industrial activity and is also a 
much older segment of the complex (The Gun Carnage Factory dates to 1904)
The fourth pole is Pune in the west which apart from the headquarters of the Army s Southern Command 
is the center of armaments and explosives research and development Four DRDO labs specializing in the study 
of these products are located here as are their corresponding production facilities Kirkee a nearby town is the 
site of both a high explosive and ammunition factory A number of ordnance faetones producing munitions are 
based nearby Finally the National Defence Academy the College of Combat at Mhow and a number of army 
cantonments are all located m this area.
Since the early defense investment in Kanpur the city has developed into a large pole of defense activity 
though difficult to define m functional terms Apart from the onginal ordnance faetones that were set up here 
there is now a small arms factory field gun factory and clothing factory There is a further anomaly a HAL 
unit In times of war in the west and north this region would be considered a vital transshipment point For 
the Air Force Kanpur acts as the central location for maintenance stores and refurbishment for its Central Air 
Command Also the location of a defense materials and stores lab here suggests that the region is used as a
48 For a fuller exposition o f the relation between defense spending and regional development in India see A P Elhance Spatial 
Organization of Aims Production in India Determinants and Impacts presented at Western Regional Science Meetings
Hawaii Feb 1990
major storage site for all lands of defense matenals Finally one of the five national institutes of technology is 
located outside the town of Kanpur
Madras apart from being a port and the pnmary industrial financial city of south India, is the location of 
the Heavy Velucles Factory and its corresponding R&D establishment It too has a large university and an 
Indian Insanite of Technology Not far from the city is the Kalpakkam Atomic Power Staaon where 
considerable nuclear research is conducted.
Falling outside the broad parameters of high technology development m the south and less advanced 
industrial acüvity in the heartland Gangetic plain are the defense sector shipyards at Bombay Goa and Calcutta. 
Mazagaon Docks and Garden Reach have m house R&D facilities and large establishments and infrastructure 
have grown around them There are naval yards as well m Cochin and Vishakapatnam with supporting DRDO 
facilities The latter yards are not producuon sites primarily but rather specialize in maintenance and refitting 
since the navy uses these harbors as bases for access to the Arabian Gulf and Bay of Bengal Stephen Cohen has 
also suggested that an important component of the factors influencing dispersion is the need to keep production 
and maintenence facilities from different sources separate 49 For instance Vishakapatnam services vessels 
derived from the Soviet Union and Bombay and those vessels of Western European origin
Motivations Behind Patterns of Development
Apart from the moavaüons influencing the locaüon of the MiG complex m the early 1960s (see below) the 
logic of state investment seems ielauvely unchanged from the colonial period Strategic and efficiency 
considerations seem to have ovendden pohucal and regional developmental desires suggesüng again a high 
degree of autonomy of state acüon. That the factors driving decisions have changed since the early days of the 
complex is best seen in the light of the largest defense project of its time smce independence the MiG project of 
the early 1960s
In the summer of 1962 the Indian and the Soviet governments signed an agreement to allow the licensed 
manufacture of MiG 21 aircraft m India. Three plants were needed for the particular technical requirements of the 
aircraft. These were set up at Nasik (Maharashtra) to manufacture airframes and for final assembly at Koraput 
(Orissa) to manufacture engmes and at Hyderabad for the manufacture of electronic equipment In spite of the 
fact that the engine and airframe plants had exdemely similar requirements except that the former had to be 
located in a cool climaüc zone locaüons 900 miles apart were finally chosen -50 According to the Soviet 
advisors had a locaüon near Nasik been chosen the existing infrastructure m the region would have both 
shortened the time for engine producüon by six to eight months and been less subject to skilled labor shortages 
At the ome Koraput was underdeveloped economically having neither industry nor sufficient communicaüon 
links
There w oe a number of problems with the site selection According to the Managing Director of HAL 
first, an engine shipped from Koraput to Nasik would take a week if sent by passenger train Second, it is 
very likely that the sensiüve parts of the engine would get damaged during transit by rail and the whole process 
have to be repeated. Once m operation when the aircraft needed overhauling the entire process would have to 
be repeated the aircraft flown to Nasik stripped of its engme the engine sent to Koraput where it would be 
overhauled and then sent back to Nasik for reassembly The whole process could easily take a month for a 
single aircraft The Managing Director admitted to the Parliament Public Affairs Committee that it would have 
been more efficient and economical if both the faetones were at one place 52
Two stated reasons for this decision were given The first was that smce the volume of producüon would 
be very high at both locaüons the organizaüon would be very unwieldy and the establishment of separate
49 Private communication Urbana IL. October IS 1990
50 Eighth Report Lok Sabha Committee on Public Undertakings Fourth Lok Sabha (1967 8) p 8
51 H ie delay would be much longer i f  sent by goods train as is more likely
52 Eighth Report Committee on Public Undertakings 1967 8 p 11
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units [would] be conducive to [future] expansion 53 Since neither of these two goals has materialized in the 
intervening 27 years it seems reasonable to assume that the real motive for the separation was as the Secretary 
of Defence Production admitted to the Parliamentary Committee for reasons of [the] economic 
development of new areas ”
In contrast the creation of a high technology security complex in the south seems driven by a propitious 
combination of strategic and efficiency factors The locations are climatically suitable Bangalore is relatively 
cooler and more temperate due to its altitude and Hyderabad s dry climate is suitable for some industrial 
metallurgical operations There is a large pool of trained and skilled engineers and scientists in all the cities and 
surplus land available for state acquisition. This region is beyond the reach of all land based Chinese and 
Pakistani aircraft (without mid air refuelling capability) though not from the Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missile (IRBM) capabilities of the People s Republic Finally as the defense posture of the country expands to 
mclude more far flung concerns such as the littoral states along the Indian Ocean this region is geographically 
well placed to support and aid that effort
To demonstrate further how long term considerations of state rather than immediate political considerations 
drove the effort it should be remembered that most of the southern part of the country was ruled by non 
Congress I governments for the period 1970 1990 Under the ruling Congress I government the practise of 
directing central government funds away from states that were not allied with it was well established as is most 
clear in the case of West Bengal However m the case of the defense complex short term party politics took a 
back seat to national security
State Functioning and Decision making
Decision making m the Defence Ministry rests with a number of committees presided over by the Defence 
Minister s Committee 54 Dealing directly with defense production is the Defence Minister s (Production and 
Supply) Committee 55 At present, at the functional level two departments within the Ministry of Defence are 
responsible for the satisfaction of the [needs of the armed] services to the maximum extent”56 These are the 
departments of Defence Production and Supplies (formed by the merger of the departments of Defence Production 
and Defence Supplies in 1985) and the department of Defence Research and Development
The former department combines two broad functions First it maintains oversight of the ordnance 
faetones and the defense public sector units Second it seeks effective coordination with the civilian sector for 
the production of additional defense related equipment These functions are earned out through six directorates
a Supplies Wing It is responsible for import substitution via civilian sector supplies the production of 
goods m the civil sector developed from defense R&D and the purchase of defense goods directly from the 
civilian sector
b Directorate of Planning and Coordination This directorate was set up in 1964 for the preparation of an 
overall defense production plan Its functions now mclude the processing of new projects in the ordnance 
faetones monitoring indigenous programs relating to electronics and aircraft and coordmating with the Supplies 
Wing for increased mdigemzation ”
c Directorate General of Inspection Apart from quality assurance and the inspection and approval of stores 
like the Supplies Wing this directorate also oversees the production of defense R&D developed goods in the 
civil sector
53 Eighth Report Committee on Public Undertakings 1967 8 p 10
54 This committee is composed of the Minister of Defence Minister o f State for Defence the three Service chiefs Defence 
Secretary Secretary D ept o f Defence Production Scientific Adviser to the Ministry o f Defence Secretary Defence Research 
and the Financial Adviser (Defence) This committee has two sub committees the Principal Personnel Officers Committee and 
Principal Supply Officers Committee
55 Apart from the members listed above this committee addiuonally con tarns the Secretaries Ministry of Defence and D ept of 
Defence Supplies Director General of Inspection and Director General of Ordnance Faetones
56 Annual Report 1986 87  Ministry o f Defence Government o f India p 60
d Directorate of Standardization To further as much as possible the degree of overlap m the supplies and 
goods used by the armed forces this directorate codifies defense stores and produces joint service standards and 
specifications
e Directorate of Defence Exhibitions
f  Directorate of Technological Development and Production (Au*) This directorate conducts quality 
assurance and inspection of indigenously produced and imported aeronautics related equipment It aids the 
development and establishment of unport substitution efforts in aeronautics components and is associated with 
larger indigenous projects at all stages of their development Finally it participates m investigations into 
aircraft accidents and crashes
The department of Defence Research and Development serves as the focal point for all scientific and 
technological aspects of national security [Its] mandate is accomplished though a network of 45 
laboratones/establishments administered by DRDO 57 These labs conduct research and development m a variety 
of areas concentrated m aeronautics special materials armaments and combat vehicles electronics naval R&D 
specialized medicine food and clothing and missiles/rocketry The DRDO is under the final supervision of the 
Scientific Advisor to the Minister of Defence
The ordnance faetones themselves are controlled by the Ordnance Factory Board headed by the Director 
General of Ordnance Faetones Nine other members assist the Director General in the management of staff and 
line” functions and the ordnance equipment and armored vehicle groups of faetones Defence public sector units 
are independently managed by state employees though overall administrative control falls under this department 
By virtue of being state owned corporations oversight is also maintained by the Parliamentary Committee on 
Public Undertakings and the Bureau of Public Enterprises This Bureau which was originally under the 
Ministry of Finance has since been shifted to the Ministry of Industries
A glance at the functions of the defense production directorates outlined above suffices to show a high 
degree of administrative overlap Both the Supplies Wing and the Directorate of Inspection encourage the 
import substitution of items by production units in the civil sector The Planning Directorate and the 
specialized Directorate of Technological Development and Producuon (Air) are both responsible for the 
indigenous production relating to aeronautics projects Both the Supplies Wing and the Planning Directorate 
undertake the conversion of defense R&D projects into production processes that can be farmed off to the private 
sector
To understand the overall functioning of the defense production bureaucracy however another aspect has to 
be factored m This is the importance of financial considerations in all state bureaucracies The pre-eminent 
position of the Ministry of Finance in the executive branch of government originates on the one hand with the 
position given to this ministry in the colonial penod and reaffirmed on the other hand, by the pressures of 
independent statehood and the near religious fanaticism of the need to conserve scarce resources ” While the 
need to be frugal was pruna facie beyond criticism the role assumed by this ministry was that of final arbiter 
m the decision making surrounding practically every large project in every ministry The entena applied by 
Finance tended to be of stnet temperance The cheapest rather than the more efficient, project was more likely 
to be approved short term cost considerations were dominant Non economic considerations were given short 
shrift often leading to a situation where long term costs rose due to mappropnate entena being applied at the 
initial stages of the project
The Ministry of Defence though relatively autonomous from civilian pressure due to its function was no 
exception The Finance Ministry seconded officers ( internal financial advisors *) to Defence the departments of 
Defence Production and Supplies the DPSUs and the Ordnance Factory Board. These individuals sat m on every 
important decision to represent the national exchequer The senior financial advisor in the Ministry of Defence 
was responsible for the final formulation of the defense budget and presented it to the Finance Ministry for their 
final approval.
57 Annual Report 1986 87 Ministry o f Defence Government of India p 61
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This earlier system appeared to have an advantage from the point of view of inter administrative bargaming 
for the budgets which emerged from each service headquarters had already been screened by lower level financial 
advisors Informal consultations with the Ministry of Finance had probably already happened and there would be 
conditional agreements about the size of the budget long before it was formally presented making swift 
acceptance built in What this system did in effect however was ensure that final budgetary allocations were 
made m the Finance Ministry rather than m the other organs of state since their own seconded staff were engaged 
m the formal process of creating the budget
As a result of criticism of the centralization of decision making m the financial allocation process the 
system began to change m installments” from the 1960s The financial responsibilities of the Defence 
Ministry became fully internalized with the introduction of the integrated financial advice system from August 
1983 but at the apparent cost of greater administrative bargaining and overt conflict58
At present the Defence Secretary and Minister scrutinize the aggregate services and departmental budgets 
and are the final authority on changes to be made within the Defence Ministry They then present a consolidated 
budget to the Defence Finance Secretary and must make a convincing case for their financial demands The 
Ministry of Finance budget section then gives the final approval of the budget, though usually contingent on at 
least a few changes or cuts Smce a large proportion of the budget is allocated towards continuing projects 
cuts are usually made m new proposals in the face of ongoing projects expansion and new benefits [for 
personnel] ”59
Though the degree of Finance Ministry control has formally lessened their influence stays strong through a 
variety of informal connections and institutions The continuity of the bureaucratic institution compared to the 
much shorter tenures of the armed forces chief of staff sometimes results in a situation where the latter are forced 
to consult Finance Ministry files to become acquainted with past policies and procedures In the case of 
budgetary requests involving the release of foreign exchange the Economic Affairs Committee of the Foreign 
Ministry is always consulted at an early stage in the budgetary process even when the foreign exchange is part 
of an existing program that has been approved in toto at its reception Most decisions to procure arms from 
abroad involve the finance ministry from the beginning or at the very latest from the point where the staff 
qualitative requirements (SQR) is presented to a negotiating committee re which all interests are 
represented.”60
The dominance of the finance ministry which ultimately has its roots in the scarcity of and increasing 
demands on resources has affected the security establishment in another way From 1964 65 the Defence 
Ministry has prepared a five year defense plan which ideally coincides with the five year development plans of 
the civilian state sector From 1970 the plan was redefined as a roll-on” plan which meant that the plan was 
to be updated every year by the addition of another year ” This exercise in innovative planning was upset the 
very next year with the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan The defense plans were substantially 
modified re 1975 1981 82 and presently stress modernization and induction of the latest technology weapon 
systems
The plan is constructed through a process of consultation and interaction between all elements of the defense 
ministry the financial advisors service headquarters defense production and DRDO But while the Ministry of 
Defence Annual Report states [the planning process] provides a forum for effecting coordination between the 
services and the research and production agencies ” it also mentions the allocation o f funds under the plan is 
made from  year to year through budgetary provision (emphasis added) This airangement causes an annual
58 The functions o f the Finance division are as follows (a) to examine all defense matters having a financial bearing (b) to render 
financial advice to committees service headquarters and their branches (c) to act as Associate Finance thereby providing a 
link to the Ministry o f Finance (d) to assist m the formulation and implementation of all scenes involving expenditure (e) to 
assist in the formulation and implementation of defense plans (f) to prepare the defense budgets and other estimates and to 
mom tor progress (g) to exercise post budget vigilance and to function as chief accounting authority to the ministry (h) to 
prepare the appropnauon accounts and (1) to discharge the responsibility for payment and internal audit o f defense expenditure 
Adapted from Annual Report 1984 85 Annexure H, Ministry o f Defence Government o f India
59 Interview with retired Finance Ministry official New Delhi November 11 1989
60 Interview with retired Finance Ministry official New Delhi November 11 1989
reconsideration of the plan to assess past performance rearrange future priorities and is a powerful 
instrument of enforcing financial discipline 61 Ostensibly the plan is based on strategic needs and long term 
security considerations and were this so this method of annual evaluation would be sensible or at least cause no 
long term harm But as another Annual Report candidly states
at the operational level planning remains a two tier exercise in choices determination of volume o f 
resources that the nation can devote to its defense and the allocation of these resources among the 
various competing interests claiming share (sic) (emphasis added)62
As many staff officers have pointed out, you cannot plan for ten or twenty years m the future and have the funds 
for these projects subject to yearly vicissitudes
The planning exercise has other problems as well Why it cannot fully relate the security environment to 
national security objectives and interests and finally to potential responses (as might be theoretically expected) 
is suggested by the well known Indian defense analyst K Subrahmanyam
The service chiefs with their tenure of three years—often less than that—are so preoccupied with 
administrative chores and planning for immediate operational conungemces that they have no time to 
devote to long term planning The defence planning staff created in 1986 had about a dozen officers 
There is besides such a rapid turnover they are unable to serve as an effective planning mechanism 63
What becomes of concern for the chiefs hence is how the security pie is being divided up among competing 
factions In a context of scarce resources and in the absence of a permanent planning staff with political 
influence the process described above in fact forces the subordination of long term security needs and strategic 
planning to the vagaries of short term financial expediency In spite of the plan being formally presented as a 
five year roll on plan with additional years being tacked on to the end rising expenses and the annual budgetary 
approval process m Parliament deny the horizon that is its value
In passing it may be said that maintenence and continuing expenses are always the first to suffer since 
these expenditures either have no active constituency (maintenance) or are predominantly related to weak services 
(the Navy) In the words of a former Finance ministry official
The planning process is really an arithmetical aggregation of what the services think they require for 
the next five years the long term planning perspective that all Services talk about is not really 
valid since the budget process does not allow this
Disregarding the security implications of the discussion above the rational bureaucrauc goal of long term 
planning is clearly undermined by procedures that deny its fulfillment.
Extent of Private Sector Participation m Defense
The department of Supplies has an important institutional role to play in encouraging private sector 
participation for it is mandated both to find civil suppliers of defense goods and to offload DRDO-indigemzed 
products on civilian producers This department tends to concentrate on smaller scale operators because 
according to them from the point of view of representatives of larger scale units in the private sector defense 
work is unrewarding for the lack of uniformity in the order pattern and the [small] volume of orders 65 
However an idea of the scale of mdigemzation and offloading can be derived from the following table
61 Annual Report 1983 84 Ministry o f Defence Government o f India p 7
62 Annual Report 1984 85 Ministry o f Defence Government o f India p 5
®  ^  Subrahmanyam “The Next Defense Plan Need for a Long Term Perspective Times of India (Bombay) 11 August 1989 p
64 Interview with retired Finance Ministry official New Delhi November 11 1989
65 Annual Report 1983 84 Ministry o f Defence Government of India p 85
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Table 6 Purchases from the Civilian Sector by Selected State Units (Figures in millions of 1985 rupees)
Dept of Supply 1985 86 2 126 23
1984 85 1 498 20
1983 84 1 528 49
1982 83 907 26
1981 82 1 049 69
HAL 1985 86 169 03
1984 85 87 30
1983 84 38 06
BEL 1983 84 58 92
1982 83 48 16
BEML 1983 84 75 27
1982 83 121 77
1981 82 106 49
GRSE 1985 86 17 99
1982 83 15 44
GSL 1984 85 4 29
1982 83 2 23
BDL 1985 86 113 64
1983 84 4 21
Source. Annual Reports Ministry of Defence Govt of India, various issues
Sub-contracting of inputs to private entrepreneurs by defense public sector units has now become a matter of 
explicit policy Both Bharat Electronics and Hindustan Aeronautics have created physical enclaves where private 
individuals are helped to create ancillary units Apart from the physical facilities financial assistance aid in 
perfecting manufacturing techniques and managerial guidance were provided at subsidized rates or free of cost, to 
help create self supporting and efficient ancillanes Additionally wherever possible purchases are made from 
the small scale sector 66
Technological factors however constrain the participation of private capital as sub contractors HAL had 
the greatest difficulty m finding appropriate suppliers because of the nature and quality of the work needed 
Also the terms under which sub-contracting was done were not always agreeable to potential suppliers All 
orders are placed for five years of which the first three years are firm and the last two are shaky [As long
as] the level of technology mvolved m manufacture was low the ancillary units in the HAL complex seemed to 
manage now it s not easy [for them]67 Implicit in these comments was also the suggestion that HAL would 
have preferred to have done without the small scale operators but the latter were foisted on them for political 
reasons
BEL has had more success in this effort. Not only do they consciously attempt offload working 
technologies as soon as possible but since a great deal of electronics manufacturing involves small 
components piece work that allows the viable functioning of small scale units is possible The company has 
set up a subcontracters s quality assessment center to ensure both quality of inputs and to act as an extension 
facility One manager suggested that this experience (of technological spread,” as he called it) was doubly 
beneficial because it aided their export effort as well Other developing countries had often stated policies of 
decentralized production the ability to construct projects where the dispersal of production loci was possible 
without loss of efficiency gave BEL an advantage m those markets 68
Most of the defense labs and public sector units using higher technology dependent processes have 
contractual relationships with private sector firms though precise figures are not available One source of 
access for private firms to the defense labs is through their access to foreign technology via collaboration 
agreements with multinationals or their subsidiaries Products of this kind include instrumentation and testing 
devices computer related peripherals and hardware including printed circuit boards optical products and lenses 
and common supplies for labs engaged in health and food research
66 At present small scale industries are defined as those that have a total capital investment o f less than Rs 70 Lakhs (1990)
67 Interview with retired HAL official Bangalore October IS 1989
68 Interview with BEL manager Bangalore October 16 1989
Hence we see a pattern of state interaction with the private sector that initially might appear to have 
rescinded the views expressed above but actually seems to use the policy of private participation to discriminate 
in favour of the small scale sector rather than allow larger and possibly more efficient capital to enter the 
industry
Problematizing the State the Private Sector and Defense
The discussion of the relation between the state and the private sector in the defense arena has taken place 
implicitly The largor debate on this issue has been primarily concerned with the relative autonomy of the 
Indian state in development Two related theoretical concerns are central to this debate the explication of the 
class nature of the state and the relative strengths of the different partners m the dominant coalition agrarian 
elites ( neh farmers’*) industrial elites (* industrial bourgeoisie”) and the state ( professionals” m the public 
sector)69
State autonomy m India is generally accepted to be declining since the mid 1960s As a consequence [of 
the rise of proprietary classes] the autonomy of the Indian state is reflected more often m its regulatory (and 
hence patronage-dispensing) than developmental role ”7® Following this most scholars have problematized the 
fundamental issue m Indian political economy as a struggle for dominance between the capitalist agricultural 
sector and the industrial bourgeoisie with the state apparatus taking on a subordinate posiuon in effect being re 
defined as part of the victor s spoils
Analytically two means of assessing the relative strength of these fractions of the dominant coalition can 
be distinguished. Simply put the first functionalist approach examines the policies of the state with respect to 
each firacuon and thereby determines m whose short and long term interests the state operates Again 
simplifying the second more reductionist opbon understands the behavior of the state by assessmg the class 
nature of the state Immediately it is clear that when put m terms of a conflict between two fractions of the 
dominant coalition the state is not simply a bystander to be appropriated and reconstituted by the eventual 
winner The state itself has the means to affect the outcome and the power of the state though reduced relative 
to other sectors is still a substantial component m the overall calculus of power in the country
The first approach is largely preferred by analysts there is more evidence using this method data can be 
collected m numerical form and the validity of conclusions would appear to be more easily supported The 
evidence is however ambiguous Agricultural elites continue to perpetuate their insulation from state 
encroachment and ensure ever increasing subsidies for agriculture especially water fertilizers and procurement 
pnces Industrial elites have benefitted from protected markets acquired monopoly profits and m the wake of 
liberalization have allowed for a new phase of technology imports without losing ground to foreign capital71 
Yet, contrary to these evaluations it may be said that liberalization shows the power of agricultural elites to 
break the protected monopolies of domestic capital by forcing greater competition Also national statistics 
show the share of agncultural product declining and the much vaunted power of the agncultural sector to insulate 
themselves can be characterized as no more than a holding game suggesting the inability of this sector to 
mercase their relative share of the national distributive product
With respect to the second option the class nature of the state empirical evidence cannot be marshalled 
easily This flows on the one hand from inadequate theorizing about the nature of the middle classes in India 
which makes it difficult to know what to look for and on the other the collection of this data which would 
probably be altitudinal studies and background surveys is next to impossible for reasons of size expense and 
access Reducing the class orientation of the state to the composition of state managers is based on their access
69 This phrase owes its ongins to the important woric on the Indian sute by Pranab Bardhan See The Political Economy of 
Development m India (Delhi Oxford University Press 1984)
70 Bardhan Political Economy of Development p 39
71 Crudely put, the pro-agncultural view is expressed m Paul Brass The Politics of India since Independence (Cambridge
Cambridge University Press 1990) Bardhan represents the pro industry view
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to cultural capital” a sophisticated theoretical construct which is difficult to defíne precisely or to limit m 
scope 72
Vanaik points out these problems of defining precisely the state or its managers and its autonomy and 
then pauses Suggesting that this is after all a transitory phase he falls back on functionalism if the 
bureaucratic class exists why has it not done better for itself m the eighties?”73 He then proceeds correctly 
to disaggregate the bureaucratic class into political elites and bureaucratic eûtes at the center and state levels 
and endows them with different powers based on the political space they occupy This sets up his resoluuon to 
the conflict scenano set out above
But the dominant coalition need not be a permanent fixture For all the sharpness of the present 
conflict between agrarian and industnal bourgeoisies it remins a struggle about the terms of 
accommodation between the first prospering India as distinct from a second where tragic levels of 
backwardness and poverty persist The dominant coalition could give way m time to a more 
conventional ruling-class alliance or even a bloc [if] the capitalist farmer fam ily [is] able to make
the transition to becoming the farmer capitalist fam ily 74
But the question of the state and its autonomy is sull unresolved75 Even if the funcuon of the state in 
contemporary India is to act as manager of domestic conflict m the sectors of defense and nauonal security it is 
much more As Vanaik himself points out
the continued allocation of significant resources to defence is not a function of the pressure of the 
public bureaucracy as a whole but the general vision of the future held by the state elite (which
mcludes top echelons of defence services) and its larger political and military ambitions Revealingly 
defence expenditure remains something of a sacred cow subject to only the faintest and most occasional 
criticisms 76
The common sense” of the state s domination of national security i e what I called at the outset of this 
paper the production of national security ” or the uncritical unanimity of the general vision of the future 
referred to above is not obvious at all If the state has lost its autonomy in most respects in the domestic arena 
how has it managed to retain it, and perhaps even enhance it in the external realm of national security9
My response is to understand the problem of state autonomy in terms of a combination of institutional 
mechanisms to retain autonomy and the larger question of state legitimacy One aspect of the analysis of the 
developing or post colonial state ignored by the scholars referred to above is the question of legitimacy The 
post-colonial state differs fundamentally from the advanced capitalist state with respect to this factor Unlike the 
legitimacy of the advanced capitalist states which is founded on a combination of internalized liberal values 
democratic msitutions of government and the historical fact of limited political enfranchisement following state 
formation the post-colonial state is overdeveloped” with respect to its coercive apparatus m a context of 
economic backwardness 77 Hence legitimacy comes from the simultaneous reversal of backwardness or the 
process of development, and from the normalization of its coercive role supplanting the dominance of the 
colonial state with the legitimate authority of the liberal state 78
72 The concept was developed by Piene Bourdieu See his Outline of a Theory o f Practise (Cambridge Cambridge University Press
1977) Achín Vanaik discusses the inadequacies o f the use o f the concept in the Indian context in Painful Transition p 20 ff
73 Vanaik PainfuTTransition p 25
74 Vanaik, PainfuTTransition p 25-6 Original emphasis
75 A further shortcoming o f this analysis is us difficulty in cleariy separating early state autonomy at the time o f dominance of a 
single political party the Congress with su te autonomy per se The relation of political regime to the S u te  is rarely made 
explicit and us implications for the present more plural situation are not clear
76  Vanaik Painful Transitions p 24
77 For the European su te see Charles Tilly ed The Formation of States in Western Europe (Princeton Princeton University Press
1975) For the notion of uover-developednessn see Hamza Alavi The Sute in Post-Colonial Societies Pakistan and 
Bangladesh New Left Review 74 (1972)
78 Ultimately legitimacy is normalcy Normalizing the actions of the sute in poliucs and in economics are acts of ideological 
production in which the sute has successfully defined the limits o f its other non sute actors while leaving its own boundaries 
unmarked In the developing world national security is normalized by the existence o f a world system in which the boundaries
The construction of legitimate authority and the process of economic development feed into each other The 
legitimacy of the state s monopoly m violence can only be supported if the state is seen to protect the interests 
of all its citizens equally whether from foreign attack or by appearing to stand as neutral arbiter m conflict 
between social groups Yet the process of economic development* especially for the latecomer does not permit 
the bystander state The state becomes the pnme motor of growth by its ability to mobilize capital influence 
over production and allocation decisions and its guarantee for legal forms of property In most arenas these 
two positions of the state m relation to society the interventionary and neutral are clearly m tension —except 
m the realm of national security
Definitions of national security vary over time and space but national security is always a public good.
Thus the state acting in the name of national security is acting for all citizens By controlling how national 
security will be defined the state also retains control over definition of the appropriate means to enhance 
national security its interventionary role comes naturally and again is justified by the public good nature of 
security But this latter aspect the definition of the means to enhance security leaves state managers open to 
the question of how well they perform those tasks Here the insututional aspect of the insulation of nauonal 
security concerns comes in. The only possible alternative to state production of the means to security is the 
private industrial sector The question then becomes how does the nauonal sector component of the state 
conunue to insulate itself from the ravages of the private sector'? The evidence appears contradictory
While the security complex m India has always been grossly biased toward the public sector there has 
always been a component of private sector parucipanon in producuon On the one hand the Industrial Policy 
Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 the primary documents of state industrial policy have always reserved the 
commanding heights’* of the economy which mcludes defense as the sole purview of the state On the other 
hand from the very origins of the complex there have been and continue to be attempts made especially when 
the budget is being discussed or the performance of the defense sector being questioned to assert that efforts had 
been made to seek out civilian contractors for defense supplies
During the time when the threat from external aggression seemed very small it was tactically useful for 
those in favor of larger defense expenditures to allow closer ties between the pnvate sector and the defense 
production enclave It made allies within the pnvate sector and could be used to point to the obvious 
developmental** gains from defense spending m the form of higher civilian capacity utilization and output For 
example defense industrialization has had its impact on the general industrialization programme and 
wherever possible therefore the defence production equipment should be used for items required m the civilian 
industry—[since] this helps civilian economic growth ^9 Justifying the output of defense industries in
terms of civilian benefits ended with the military debacle of 1962
Hence during this penod the relation between defense and development was constructed in terms of a 
simple trade-off or a zero-sum game Although national security was defined as a totality incorporating both 
development and defense the perception was very strong that in fact these two goals were mutually exclusive 
This perception takes its clearest institutional form in the definition of defense outlays as non Plan expenditures 
This definition bebed the conceptual totahty indicated above and made it clear that defense was outside the course 
of cm han development overseen by the Planning Commission
Once the need for military security entered the pohtical discourse as a factor that needed no justification the 
relation between the defense and the civilian production sector changed substantially The state defense managers 
now could articulate quite exphcitly their dislike and rejection of the pnvate sector Their discursive strategy 
employed two primary ideological referents and has been described as [a] lingenng Brahmmical cultural
of all states have alrady been defined beyond question. The developing state is legitimized m the eyes o f the external world by 
being accepted as the sole possesor o f a certain territory
79 H C Sann Defence and Development USI National Secunty Lectures (Delhi United Service Institution of India 1979) pp 50
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environment that is highly suspicious of private capital accumulation and often identifies money making m 
trade and industry with greed and dishonesty reinforced with modem socialist rhetoric 80
Negative images of the private sector operated at many levels within society These images found 
expression m the resentment toward petty shopkeepers who were seen as hoarders m urnes of shortage thereby 
making profits from the misery of others Others also quesüoned the nauonalist credentials of the large pnvate 
busmess houses who were seen to have become patriots only when it was clear which way the wind was 
blowing and even then hedged their bets by supposing both sides Both led to the same result, i e an atutude 
toward pnvate capital never completely free of suspicion and resentment
These images are explicit m the views and wnungs of state managers often masked by reasons of 
pracucality For example testimony by representaUves of the Defence Ministry in Parliamentary heanngs 
asserted that pnvate sector producuon was slower” or capacity too small” or that there was an unspecified 
difficulty for ‘vanous reasons which meant that the pnvate sector could not supply more than a certain amount 
of defense supplies especially because of the lack of technical guidance research and scienufic assistance 81 
More direct statements on this atutude come from a former Defence Secretary P V R  Rao Rao had no 
hesitation saying that the quality of goods made by the pnvate sector could not be trusted and raises the bogey of 
the imperative of national secunty A civil consumer has no option but to make do for example with a knife 
that does not cut or has a short life a soldier at the front has no option ”82 He went on to say the pnvate sector 
was inherently more expensive because they were not willing to share resources with other pnvate firms in order 
to achieve effective scales of operation They had their eye on immediate profits aided by the absence of quality 
control and the prevalence of a seller s market [Additionally] a few unscrupulous men thought the 
invitation to assist [the war effort] was a good opportunity to secure import licenses and foreign exchange 
which would have been otherwise unavailable ”83
Or m the even more ideologically explicit statement below the dangers of a military industrial complex are 
raised the peace loving nature of India is affirmed but finally some room is given to the limits of pnvate 
sector participation—under the stnct control of the defense enclave
The pnvate sector would not normally be interested in building up such industrial potential for which 
there is no ready or steady market [Hence they would have to export] The undesirable pressures 
generated by the pnvate armament industry m Europe and Amenca are well known It would be 
inconsistent with the principles for which India stands to give a foothold to such an armament industry 
within the country [Government of India policy] permits the pnvate sector to play its part m the 
manufacture of ancillary equipment or components and assemblies which will facilitate the manufacture 
of the end product by the public sector units 84
The power of this rhetonc ultimately allowed the defense production sector to ovemde the views of both special 
defense committees and Parliamentary oversight committees
Ordnance faetones should concentrate on producing vital and cntical items for which the capacity is 
either not available or cannot be established in the civil sector for vanous reasons leaving it to the 
trade to supply common user items for civil and defense purposes 83
Both the Baldev Smgh Committee and study groups of the Planning Commission (1965) formulated plans that 
would have led to the direct involvement of the pnvate sector in defense production They probably meant no
80 Bardhan Political Economy p 58
81 Appropriation Accounts and Audit Reports (Defence Services) Public Affairs Committee 69th Report 4th Lok Sabha (1968 69)
pp 11 12
82 P V R Rao Defence Without Drift (Bombay Popular Prakashan 1970) p 234
83 Rao Defence Without Drift p 235 The resentment of the pnvate sector is common among the personnel of the aimed forces as
well. In an interview with an Air Force supplies officer for example the individual recounted with pleasure the satisfaction he 
took m making ubanias (traders) m their expensive cars sit in his anteroom for hours before letting them meet him Delhi 
October 7 1989
84 P V R Rao Defence Without Drift
85 Public Affairs Committee Appropruttion p 14
more than the supply of dual use items like clothing non armored vehicles and components by the private 
sector where capability already existed The industrialist J R D Tata m the early 1950s had suggested the 
possibility of the production of jeeps trucks and even tanks in the pnvate sector under a consortium of private 
entrepreneurs 86 None of these plans ever got off the ground
The ability of the defense bureaucrats to insulate themselves by excluding the pnvate sector was aided by 
the consonance of their message with the larger political culture Socialist goals were embedded m the anti 
colonial independence struggle and enshnned in the Directive Principles of the Constitution The massive 
expenditures incurred to build up a state sector in the 1950s and 1960s the undemocratic top-down process of 
state planning the extremely restnctive laws and regulation on both the domestic and foreign pnvate sector the 
nationalization of the largest pnvate banks the institution of expert committees like the Dutt Committee to 
look into anti trust violations were accepted by most people without question due to the legitimacy of 
Nehruvian socialism and its implicit image of the pnvate sector
From this point and aided by the intensifying technological requirements of a modem arms industry it was 
possible for the state defense production sector to create an enclave insulated from both the pnvate industrial 
sector and other sectors of the state apparatus As legitimacy began to decline in developmental areas of state 
intervention the state began to rely more and more on national secunty and mega technology projects m order 
to stem the flow Cetens paribus this process of the changing relation between the state and civil society would 
have ensured this sector greater autonomy and lack of oversight However the international context has changed 
and the nature of conflict in South Asia appears now to be primarily driven by sub national bodies The 
implications of these exogenous changes are the subject for another paper
86 Interview with reared defense production official Delhi October 9 1989
Appendix A
1 Ministry of Defence
a Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) 
b Ordnance Faetones (OFs)
c The Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
2 Department of Space/Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)
a. Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC)
b Physical Research Laboratory (PRL)
c Snhankota Range (SHAR)
d Liquid Propulsion Systems Center (LPSC)
e ISRO Telemetry Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC)
f National Remote Sensing Agency (NSRA)
3 Department of Atomic Energy
a. Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) 
b Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) 
c Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) 
d Reactor Research Center Kalpakkam 
e Indian Rare Earths Limited 
f Uramum Corporation of India Limited 
g Nuclear Fuels Complex
4 Department of Electronics
a Semi-Conductor Complex Limited (SCL) 
b Center for Advanced Studies m Electronics (CASE)
c Society for Applied Microwave Electronics Engineering and Research (S AMEER)
Appendix B
Total Capital Outlay Production Units and Armed Services (Rs Lakhs and Millions of US dollars in 1960 pnces 
Selected Years)
Year Rs Lakhs Million Dollars
1962 3 16 334 16 343 01
1963 4 29 127 08 613 13
1964 5 33 012 66 693 25
1965 6 39 869 34 626 97
1966 7 44 683 54 595 78
1967 8 65 683 48 875 78
1968 9 76 261 47 1 016 82
1980 1 739 121 78 8 535 88
1981 2 1 067 418 65 11 289 46
1982 3 1 291 355 73 12 786 97
1983 4 1 638 286 14 14 417 73
1984 5 1 974 153 87 15 960 50
Source Defence Service Estimates Ministry of Defence Government of India and Bureau of Public Enterprises 
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